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ing the unbalanced spatio-temporal properties of the energy sup-
ply across the deployment terrain of energy harvesting WSNs
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steps: the local energy storage at each sensor node based on its
traffic load to meet its own needs; within the energy storage pro-
cedure sensor nodes with excess energy transmit a part of their
energy to nodes with energy shortage through the energy trad-
ing. Inventory theory and game theory are respectively applied
to solving the local energy storage problem at each sensor node
and the energy trading problem among multiple sensor nodes.
Numerical results show that compared with the static energy co-
operation method without energy trading, the Stackelberg Model
based Game we design in this paper can significantly improve
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ratio of the harvested energy which is unevenly distributed in the
WSNs.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Recently, energy efficiency has become a hot research topic in wireless net-
works [1–7]. Particularly, energy management is always important for wire-
less sensor networks (WSNs) due to the limited battery capacity of senor
node. A viable approach for sustainably powering the WSNs is to harvest
energy from the environment, such as solar, vibrations, thermal, etc. [8] [9].
For the energy harvesting WSNs, the difference between the available envi-
ronment power and the power consumption through the network is the key
challenge. To use the harvested energy efficiently, the energy aware task al-
lotment, (i.e., the task distribution among nodes is adapted to the detailed
characteristics of environmental energy availability) has been researched ex-
tensively in recent years [10] [11]. However, with the emerging research hot
spot of wireless power transfer (WPT) [12] [13] and simultaneously wireless
information and power transfer (SWIPT) [14]- [18], the energy management
problem of energy harvesting WSNs should be rethought from the perspective
of energy cooperation.
Energy cooperation method among wireless network nodes powered by
renewable energy is studied in [19], where the authors determine energy man-
agement policies that maximize the system throughput within a given dura-
tion using a Lagrangian formulation and the resulting Karush-Kuhn-Tucker
(KKT) optimality conditions. In [20], base stations in coordinated multi-
point enabled cellular networks are equipped with energy harvesting devices
to provide renewable energy and employ smart meters and aggregator to en-
able both two-way information and energy flows with the smart grid. The
renewable energy cooperation among base stations is formulated as a con-
vex optimization problem. Different from the energy cooperation problem
in renewable energy powered cellular networks and wireless local area net-
works in which the aim of energy cooperation is usually optimize the net-
work throughput or increase the performance of the total network and the
energy cooperation is usually a optimization problem, the energy cooperation
in WSNs is a equilibrium problem because information from each node is
equally important for us to surveillance environment. Considering the spatio-
temporal properties of the energy supply across the deployment terrain of
energy harvesting WSNs and the dynamic traffic load at each sensor node,
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FIGURE 1
Wireless sensor network with wireless power transfer.
the aim of energy cooperation among multiple sensor nodes is to balance the
energy and traffic at each sensor node and to improve the overall energy uti-
lization ratio of the WSNs.
In this paper we propose the energy cooperation policy for energy har-
vesting WSNs with WPT, through the local energy storage at each node and
energy trade among multiple nodes. A combination of inventory theory and
game theory is applied to energy cooperation among sensor nodes for the
first time to guarantee the energy supply at each sensor node and simultane-
ously increase the total energy utilization ratio. The structure of this paper
is as follows. Section 2 presents the system model which includes the net-
work model, and the energy supply and demand model at each sensor node.
Section 3 formulates the local storage of energy at each sensor node as an
inventory problem, and formulates the energy cooperation problem among
nodes as a game model. Section 4 solves the inventory problem using in-
ventory theory and designs the Cournot Model based Game and Stackelberg
Model based Game to solve the energy trading problem among multiple sen-
sor nodes. Section 5 describes the algorithm flow of the proposed games in
detail through a case study and discusses the numerical simulation results.
Finally, section 6 concludes the works of this paper.
3
2 SYSTEM MODEL
In this section, we present the system model which includes network model,
and the energy supply and demand model of each sensor node.
2.1 Network Model
Each sensor node equipped with energy harvesting devices collects ambi-
ent energy, such as solar power, microbial fuel cells, vibrations and acoustic
noise, converses the energy into electrical form, and stores the energy into
a rechargeable battery. As shown in Figure 1, energy cooperation among
geographically distributed nodes is implemented through the wireless power
transfer from one node to the other. Sensor node in the network is either a re-
newable energy supplier or an energy demander. For simplicity, mobility [22]
and handover [21, 23] are not considered in this paper. Each sensor node
helps point to point packet delivery through routing packets from its neigh-
bor nodes [24]- [26]. The radio channel which characterizes the propagation
of radio signals among the nodes is modeled as the band-limited Gaussian
channel with power constraint [27, 29].
2.2 Energy Supply: Cooperation based Local Storage
Energy stored at node i (denoted by Ni) and time t is, Si(t) ≥ 0. Si(t) is in
general a stochastic process, consisting of its own harvesting energy denoted
by Hi(t), and cooperative energy transferred from other node j, Nj , denoted
by Cji(t). The value of Cji(t) can be positive, representing an energy deficit
at Ni, or be negative, representing a surplus of energy at Ni.
Si(t) = Hi(t) + Cji(t), {i, j ∈ Z+; i 6= j}
ForNi, the amount ofHi(t) and Si(t) is real-timely monitored and recorded.
2.3 Energy Demand: Data Packets Arrival and Energy Consumption
Model
The number of data packets arriving at each sensor node has been dynam-
ically changing not only in the time domain but also in the spatial domain.
Data packets, which we call traffic load interchangeably in this paper, ar-
riving at one node for a long period of time has great uncertainty, however,
during a certain period of time, the arrival process of traffic load can be re-
garded as Poisson process. Assuming that the arrival rate of data packet at Ni
during time period [t, t+ τ ] is µ (µ ≥ 0 ), the number of data packet arriving
during [t, t + τ ] is a random variable k that subjects to Poisson distribution
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with parameter µ × τ which means the expected value of traffic load which
we call traffic quantity. The probability distribution function (p.d.f.) of k is
expressed as:
pk(τ) =
(µ× τ)k
n!
e−µτ , k = 0, 1, . . . , n.{n ∈ Z+}
The energy demand of nodeNi at time t: Di(t), is also Poisson process, since
the energy consumed at each node is primarily used to transmit data packets.
For nodeNi, when the number of data packet arriving during [t, t+τ ] is k, the
energy demand, d = dk = a × k is a random variable also obeying Poisson
distribution. Here, a represents the average energy consumption of per unit
data packet. Denote the probability of d = dk as p(d) = pdk(τ) then we get,
p(d) = pdk(τ) = pk(τ) =
(µ× τ)k
n!
e−µτ (1)
s.t.
{
0 < dk < dk+1∑∞
k=0 pk(τ) = 1
When the arriving rate of data packet µ changes along with time, the p.d.f.
of pdk(τ) and pk(τ) changes along with µ accordingly.
For each node in the WSN, the energy consumed for data packets trans-
mission is determined by two factors which include data rate and link quality.
Consider a band-limited Gaussian channel model with power constraint. The
achievable data rate at Ni is as follows
rb = bilog2(1 + SNRi) = bilog2(1 +
Pi
biN0
) (2)
where N0 denotes the power spectral density of the additive white Gaussian
noise, Pi ≥ 0 and bi ≥ 0 denote the transmit power and bandwidth from one
sensor node to node Ni respectively. To reach a threshold level of data rate at
a sensor node with a specific link quality, the transmit power needed is,
Pi = biN0(2
rb
bi − 1) (3)
The terms energy and power are interchangeably used in this paper, since
the the transmitting power at each sensor node is the main part of energy
consumption.
5
3 PROBLEM FORMULATION
Through analyzing the distinctive attribute of the energy cooperation among
nodes in WSNs, we formulate the local energy storage procedure as an inven-
tory problem and formulate the energy cooperation process among nodes as
a game theory problem.
3.1 Traffic Aware Energy Inventory
Inventory theory is a branch of operation research [28]. A main reason to
develop inventory theory is that, for the supply side it is rarely possible to
predict the demand exactly. Inventory serves as a buffer against the uncertain
and fluctuation of the demand and keeps a supply of items available in case the
item are needed by its customers. An inventory problem consists of four basic
elements: demand, supply, inventory strategy and inventory cost. The inven-
tory cost c generally consists of four components: setup cost cse, holding cost
ch, shortage cost cs and purchasing cost cpur, i.e., c = cse + ch + cs + cpur.
The goal of inventory control is determining the optimal inventory amount
S at an appropriate time point t to satisfy the demand d by using a specific
inventory strategy at the lowest inventory cost c. There will be two different
results of inventory amount S for an inventory strategy:
• S < d: The storage amount is less than demand. The shortage cost
need to pay is (d− S)× CS . Here, CS represents unit shortage cost.
• S ≥ d: The storage amount is more than demand. The holding cost is
(S − d)× CH . Here, CH represents unit holding cost.
At each sensor node, traffic load leads to the demand for energy and the
harvested energy acts as the supply. Each node at WSNs respectively deter-
mines the optimal amount of the harvested energy reserved for its own traffic
load. Inventory strategy for the harvested energy at each node is a bridge that
connects traffic load with energy supply. After briefly introducing the inven-
tory theory, we obtain the optimal distributed management of the harvested
energy unbalancedly distributed in WSNs through adopting an appropriate
inventory strategy to find the optimal inventory amount of the item that is
needed, i.e., the harvested energy. As to inventory cost, holding cost and
shortage cost is the most important part we consider, since the setup cost and
purchasing cost of the ambient energy are negligible. In this paper, holding
cost represents the limited capacity of battery that the higher capacity means
the higher cost and shortage cost represents expenses due to the deficient
storage of energy, such as the loss of packets. When demand d is a stochastic
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variable and the p.d.f. of d is known, denoted as P (d) , in the case of only
considering holding cost and shortage cost, the expected value of inventory
cost EV (c) can be expressed as:
EV (c) = CH ×
∑
d≤S
(S − d)P (d) + CS ×
∑
d>S
(d− S)P (d) (4)
The optimal inventory amount of renewable is a value of S, to make the in-
ventory cost EV (c) minimum.
3.2 Energy Cooperation: Energy Trading Method between Energy Sup-
plier and Demander
After calculating the optimal amount of the harvested energy that should be
stored in advance through the inventory process at each node, all the sen-
sor nodes are divided into two categories: energy suppliers, i.e., the energy
stored in battery is more than demand, and energy demanders, i.e. the energy
stored in battery cannot meet the demand. Each energy demander applies for
a certain amount of energy from energy suppliers, and the suppliers want to
acquire an income from selling their extra energy. The supplier also needs
to consider its selling cost resulting from that the energy sold to the deman-
der will not available to the supplier although the supplier need more energy
later. Hence, confronting an energy demander with a certain amount of en-
ergy demand, each supplier should adopt proper strategies to determine the
appropriate amount of energy to sell, and all suppliers get into a relation-
ship of checks and balances to determine the optimal amount to give and the
optimal price to take. It forms the game among all energy suppliers.
When it comes to game theory, games are characterized by a number of
players or decision makers who interact, possibly threaten each other and
form coalitions, take actions under uncertain conditions, and finally receive
some benefit or reward or possibly some punishment or monetary loss [30].
The strategic form of a game is typically defined by these three objects:
1. the set, M = 0, 1, . . . ,m.{m ∈ Z+}, of players,
2. the sequence, A1, . . . , Am, of strategy sets of the players, and
3. the sequence, f1(a1, . . . , am), . . . , fm(a1, . . . , am), of real-valued pay-
off functions of the players.
The game is denoted as G = {A1, . . . , Am; f1, . . . , fm}. Each energy sup-
plier node j, Nj , acts as a player, and all energy supplier nodes construct
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a game. Energy supplier Nj choose a strategy aj∗ based on its own sit-
uation and other suppliers’ decision, to maximize its own payoff function
fj(a1, . . . , aj
∗, . . . , am). Relative to supplier Nj , other m − 1 suppliers re-
spectively choose their best strategies, we call the game reach the Nash Equi-
librium, if the payoff function satisfies the following equation:
fj(a1
∗, . . . , aj∗, . . . , am∗) ≥ fj(a1∗, . . . , aj , . . . , am∗) (5)
In other words, each player in the game cannot achieve a better payoff only
through changing the strategy itself. In this paper, game among all energy
suppliers is one kind of duopoly game with complete information (i.e. for
each energy supplier, the history decisions of other suppliers are known).
Through finding the Nash Equilibrium solution, the ultimate aim of the game
theoretic approach of energy cooperation among all sensor nodes is to im-
prove the selling volume of the harvested energy thereby to improve the uti-
lization ratio of the harvested energy distributed in the whole WSN.
4 PROBLEM SOLUTION
In this section, we firstly present the inventory control policy (s, S) where
s and S are levels of inventory quantity, and deduce the solution method
of the two parameters. After the inventory calculation, we design the game
theoretic energy cooperation mode based on the Cournot Model of Duopoly
and Stackelberg Model of Duopoly.
4.1 Energy Inventory
Assume the existing storage amount of the harvested energy of node Ni at
time t is I . In the inventory control policy (s, S), an order is placed to increase
the item’s inventory amount to the level S as soon as this inventory amount
reaches or drops below the level s [31]. In this paper we name s inventory
bottom line and S optimal Inventory amount. Inventory process proceeds
from one time period to the next, and this cycle repeats. When demand is a
stochastic variable changing along with time, parameters s and S also change
along with time, denoted as (s(t), S(t)). Each node at WSN respectively
implements (s, S) policy then obtains the optimal amount of energy reserved
for its total traffic load.
Optimal Inventory Amount S∗
As analyzing in section II, energy demand d during time period [t, t + τ ],
is a random variable obeying Poisson distribution that the p.d.f is expressed
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in Equation(1). The quantity of data packet arriving during [t, t + τ ] takes
the discrete value, so that energy demand d also takes discrete value. For
simplicity, the value of parameters s and S range in {d0, d1, · · · , dn}. When
S equals da, denote S as Sa, (0 ≤ a ≤ n). There are three cases of the
relationship between S and d:
• S < d: The amount of energy reserved in the battery is deficient. The
energy cannot satisfy the demand and sensor node has so limited energy
to route packets that results in packets loss and other network problems,
which we call energy shortage cost.
• S = d: It is the optimal inventory amount. Energy reserved in the
battery exactly satisfies the demand.
• S > d: Energy reserved in the battery exceeds demand and the redun-
dant energy needs additional battery capacity which leads to holding
cost.
At each inventory period, on the basis of Equation(4) we deduce the ex-
pected value of inventory cost C(S) for the inventory amount S:
C(S) = cse + CPUR(S − I) + CH ×
∑
d≤S
(S − d)p(d)
+CS ×
∑
d>S
(d− S)p(d) (6)
where p(d) is expressed in Equation(1) and CPUR is the unit purchase cost.
Take Equation(1) into Equation(6), we get the expected inventory cost for
every specific value of S.
C(S) = cse + CPUR(S − I)
+CH ×
∑
a≤k
(S − dk) (µ× τ)
k
n!
e−µτ
+CS ×
∑
a>k
(dk − S) (µ× τ)
k
n!
e−µτ (7)
9
When S = Sa = da, we obtain the following derivation,
∆C(Sa) = C(Sa+1) + C(Sa)
= CPUR ×∆Sa + CH ×∆Sa
∑
d≤Sa
p(d)− SC ×∆Sa
∑
d>Sa
p(d)
= CPUR ×∆Sa + CH ×∆Sa
∑
d≤Sa
p(d)
−CS ×∆Sa(1−
∑
d>Sa
p(d))
= (
∑
d>Sa
p(d)− CS − CPUR
CS + CPUR
)× (CH − CS)×∆Sa (8)
Denote
∑
d>Sa
p(d) as F (Sa), and CS−CPURCS+CPUR as F . Generally, F has a value
between 0 and 1 (0 ≤ F ≤ 1). Now Equation(8) is rewritten as:
∆C(Sa) = (F (Sa)− F )× (CS + CS)×∆Sa (9)
where (CH + CS) × ∆Sa ≥ 0, and F (Sa) monotonically increases along
with a. The plus or minus characteristic of ∆C(Sa) is the same with that of
F (Sa)− F so that ∆C(Sa) is also monotonically increasing.
The p.d.f. of k analyzed in section II shows that the probability of one
data packet or n data packets arriving during time period [t, t+ τ ], i.e., p1(τ)
and pn(τ), are extremely low. Set F (S1) =
∑
d≤S1 p(d) = p1(τ), due to
the very small value of p1(τ), then take F (S1) = p1(τ) < F . Similarly, take
F (Sn−1) = 1−pn(τ) > F , i.e., pn(τ) < 1−F . Now we get these following
equations:
∆C(S1) = (F (S1)− F )× (CH + CS)×∆S1
= (p1 − F )(CH + CS)×∆S1 < 0
∆C(Sn−1) = (F (Sn−1)− F )× (CH + CS)×∆Sn−1
= (1− pn − F )(CH + CS)×∆Sn−1 > 0
We have known that ∆C(Sa) is monotonically increasing along with a, and
now we conclude that the value of ∆C(Sa) increases from a minus value to a
plus one. Accordingly, the value of C(Sa) firstly increase and then decrease.
Therefore, a value S∗ = Sa∗ = da∗ is subsistent to make C(Sa) minimum.
Here, a∗ is a value in in {0, 1, · · · , n}. The value S∗ definitely makes these
following relational expressions simultaneously valid:
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• ∆C(Sa∗−1) < 0, according to Equation(10): F (Sa∗−1 − F ) < 0,
i.e.,F (Sa∗−1) < F .
• ∆C(Sa∗) ≥ 0, according to Equation(10): F (Sa∗−F ) ≥ 0, i.e.,F (Sa∗) ≥
F .
The optimal inventory amount S∗ that makes the expected value of inven-
tory cost minimum can be obtained from the following equation:∑
d≤Sa∗−1
p(d) < F =
CS − CPUR
CS + CH
≤
∑
d≤Sa∗
p(d) (10)
Two extreme situations:
• F (S1) = p1 ≥ F , i.e., ∆C(S1) > 0. In this case, for an arbitrary value
of a(a = 0, 1, 2, · · · , n− 1) the relational expression: ∆C(Sa) > 0 is
always established, that is S = S1 = d1. Additionally, the relational
expression:F < F (S1) =
∑
d≤Sa∗ p(d) demonstrates that the value
of p(d1) is very large. In other words, the probability of a very less
demand for energy is very high, and this corresponds to the situation of
very low traffic load at a sensor node.
• F (Sn−1) = 1 − pn < F , i.e., ∆C(Sn−1) > 0. In this case, for an
arbitrary value of a(a = 0, 1, 2, · · · , n − 1) the relational expression:
∆C(Sa) < 0 is always established, that is S = Sn = dn. Additionally,
the relational expressions F (Sn−1) < F and F < 1 = F (Sn) demon-
strate that the value of p(dn) is very large. That is to say, the probability
of a great demand for energy is very high, and this corresponds to the
situation of very high traffic load at a sensor node.
Inventory Bottom Line s
The optimal inventory amount S∗ has been derived in previous subsection.
When the existing storage amount I reaches the level s, the expected value
of cost resulting from not increasing inventory should be less than that of
increasing inventory to S∗, expressed by the relational expression:∑
d≤s
CH(s− d)p(d) +
∑
d>s
CS(d− s)p(d)
≤ cse + CS(S∗ − s) +
∑
d≤S∗
CH(S
∗ − d)p(d) +
∑
d>S∗
CS(d− S∗)p(d)
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i.e.,
CPUR × s+
∑
d≤s
CH(s− d)p(d) +
∑
d>s
CS(d− s)p(d)
≤ cse + CPUR × S∗ +
∑
d≤S∗
CH(S
∗ − d)p(d) +
∑
d>S∗
CS(d− S∗)p(d)
(11)
Equation(11) is obviously valid, when s = S∗, so that there must be at least
one value of s to make Equation(11) established. Since the inventory item for
each sensor node at WSN is the harvested energy which is harvested freely
at the sensor node itself, the setup cost cse and unit purchasing cost CPUR
are negligible. Let CPUR and cs in Equation(11) equal zero, we find that in
the scenario described in this paper, the order point s is exactly the optimal
inventory amount S∗. That is to say, for each sensor node, an order is placed
to increase the inventory amount of energy to the level S∗ if the inventory
amount drops below the level S∗ at each set time period.
4.2 Energy Trading Method: A Game Theoretical Approach
We first discuss the existence of the Nash Equilibrium solution in more gen-
eral games, more details can be found in literature [30] and its references.
Theorem 1. (Nash 1950): In the n-player normal-form gameG = {A1, . . . ,
Am; f1, . . . , fm}, if n is finite and Ai is finite for every i then there exists at
least one Nash equilibrium, possibly involving mixed strategies.
A more universal method to determine the existence of Nash equilibrium
solution [30] is to verify whether the game process meets the following con-
ditions:
1. the number of player n is finite;
2. the strategy set (i.e., action set) {Ai, . . .} is bounded closed and convex
set.
3. the payoff function in the action set is continuous and quasi concave.
The first two conditions are easy to be satisfied. To achieve the Nash equi-
librium solution, the key point is designing appropriate payoff function for
players. In what follows, strictly according to the requirements stated above
and the network feature of WSN, we design the payoff function for both en-
ergy supplier and demander node at the energy harvesting WSN. The games
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proposed in this paper is based on the classical Cournot Model of Duopoly
which is Static game with complete information, and the classical Stackelberg
Model of Duopoly which is Dynamic Games with Complete Information.
When a sensor node (which is an energy demander) requests for a certain
amount of energy, the energy supplier nodes execute the game theory process
and provide an appropriate amount of energy. If the amount of energy each
supplier determines to sell stays the same for three times in succession of
the games, it indicates achieving the Nash Equilibrium solution. An energy
cooperation process consists of the following steps:
1. Sensor node which is energy demander makes a request for buying en-
ergy and broadcast this request to energy suppliers.
2. Energy supplier nodes receive the request and each energy supplier get
into the decision making state to determine the amount of energy to sell
through a game theoretic approach.
3. Stop the game process when the amount and price of energy provided
by energy suppliers reach the steady value, i.e., achieve the Nash Equi-
librium solution.
4. Each energy supplier transmit the energy with the amount determined
by step 2 to the energy demander node.
5. The energy demander node receive the energy transmitted from energy
suppliers.
Cournot Model based Game
Cournot Model of Duopoly is a kind of static game with complete informa-
tion. The form of Cournot Model of Duopoly is as follows: first the players
simultaneously choose actions; then the players receive payoffs that depend
on the combination of actions just chosen. At each move in the game the
player with the move knows the full history of the play of the game thus far,
and each player’s payoff function is common knowledge among all the play-
ers. Considering the particular attributes of the energy harvesting WSN, we
design the game among energy suppliers based on the Cournot Model. The
payoff function of energy supplier node is,
fs(pi) = qpi − C(pi) (12)
where pi is the amount of energy sold from energy supplier node Ni, q is the
price of selling the energy, and C(pi) is the cost function of selling pi amount
energy.
13
The price q of energy is determined by the total amount of energy sold by
all the suppliers. The precise relationship between the total sell-through and
the price of energy can be deduced from the payoff function of the energy
demander. Referring to literature [32], we design the payoff function,
fd(p) =
M∑
i=1
pik
(d)
i −
1
2
(
M∑
i=1
p2i + 2
M∑
i 6=j
pipj)−
M∑
i=1
qpi (13)
where k(d)i is the energy efficiency of demander, defining as the ratio of the
data rate of the energy demander node to the power used for transmitting these
packets. The energy efficiency can be deduced from Equation (3):
k
(d)
i =
rb
Pi
=
rb
biN0(2
rb
bi − 1)
(14)
Equation (13) is a quadratic and quasi concave function, and there must be
a maximum value. Taking the derivative of the amount of power p in Equa-
tion (13), we achieve the maximum value of payoff of the demander and the
relationship between energy price and amount.
∂fd(p)
∂pi
= k
(d)
i −
M∑
i=1
pi − q = 0 (15)
We get the price of energy,
q = k
(d)
i −
M∑
i=1
pi (16)
Take Equation (14) into (16), we achieve the relationship between energy
price and the sales,
q =
rb
biN0(2
rb
bi − 1)
−
M∑
i=1
pi (17)
Then we propose the selling cost function C(pi) of the energy supplier. If
a supplier decides to sell a certain amount of energy to a demander, the sold
energy can not been taken back, although the supplier faces serious shortages
of energy later. In other words, suppliers take risks to sell their energy. Based
on the impact of the quality of service of the supplier node resulting from
selling energy, we design the selling cost function C(pi).
C(pi) = wDi(P
req
i − k(s)i
Si − pi
Di
)2 (18)
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where Di is the traffic quantity of data packets, P
req
i is the amount of energy
needed, Si is the amount of harvested energy stored at Ni, k
(s)
i is the en-
ergy utilization ratio of energy supplier node, k(s)i = P
req
i /(Si/Di), w is the
weight of cost function. The higher value of w means a longer distance be-
tween supplier and demander, and that means a greater cost causing by power
transmit loss.
Take Equation (17) and (18) into (12), we achieve the payoff function of
the energy supplier node, as follows.
fs(pi) = (
rb
biN0(2
rb
bi − 1)
−
M∑
i=1
pi)pi − wDi(P
req
i pi
Si
)2 (19)
The game process: Each energy supplier sells energy with the same quality
and price. The price fluctuates with the demand. The action of each supplier is
selfish an uncooperative, and the game among suppliers is the determination
of selling volume of energy. According to other suppliers history data of
selling volume, each supplier determines the most suitable selling volume.
The suppliers simultaneously choose actions to determine their own selling
volume. Then the suppliers receive payoffs that depend on the combination
of actions just chosen. After several times games, all energy suppliers get into
the balanced state and each supplier achieves the stable equilibrium value of
the selling volume of energy. In section 5, through a case study the game
algorithm will be introduced in detail.
Stackelberg Model based Game
Stackelberg Model of Duopoly is a kind of dynamic games with complete
information. The payoff function of energy supplier and demander, and wire-
less channel model of the Stackelberg Model are the same with that of Cournot
Model based Game we analyzed above. The difference is the game process:
In the Stackelberg Model based Game, a certain number of suppliers move
first and another part of suppliers move second. The detailed algorithm will
be presented through a case study in section 5.
5 CASE STUDY AND SIMULATION
In this section, we first set the parameters values for our system model and
state the game model we proposed in section 4.2 in detail. Then we provide
numerical results for evaluating the performance of the energy cooperation
policy we proposed based on the game theoretic framework.
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Algorithm 1 Cournot Model based Game
1: Initialization: rb = 40k bits, bi = 10M Hz, N0 = −50 dBm, w = 0.5,
Di = 15, P
req
i /Si = 120uW/160uW ;
2: for i = 1 : M do
3: Simplify the payoff function of energy supplier node Ni: fs(pi) =
(357−∑Mj=1,j 6=i pj − pi)pi − 4p2i ;
4: Deduce the expression of pi by solving the partial differential equation:
∂fs(p)
∂pi
= 0, thus far, pi = 110 (357−
∑M
j=1,j 6=i pj);
5: Achieve the value of pi by taking the history data of pj into the above
function.
6: end for
5.1 Case Study
At sensor node Ni, data packet arrives during time period [t, t + τ ] at rate
µ. The expected value of traffic load µ × τ that we call traffic quantity is
respectively set to 5, 10, 20. One data packet corresponds to one unit energy
1. Neglect setup cost and purchasing cost, for that the harvested energy is
free. Two cases are taken into consideration. In the case which the holding
cost is lower than shortage cost, we set the following values: unit holding
cost CH = 1; unit shortage cost CS = 4; the existing storage amount I = 2
units of energy. In the case which the holding cost is higher than shortage
cost, we set the following values: unit holding cost CH = 4; unit shortage
cost CS = 3; the existing storage amount I = 2 units of energy. The Cross-
bow Berkeley motes are one of the most versatile wireless sensor network
devices on the market for prototyping purposes. In this paper, we take the
correlated parameters of Berkeley motes as standard to set the parameters
values of our model. The operating frequency of Berkeley motes are in ISM
(Industrial Scientific Medical) band, either 916.5 MHz or 433 MHz, with a
data rate of 40 kilobits per seconds, and having a range of 30 feet to 100
feet. Set the threshold value of data rate of each sensor node as 40k bits,
rb = 40k bits, the bandwidth as 10 MHz, bi = 10M Hz, and the the power
spectral density of the additive white Gaussian noise as -50 dBm, N0 = −50
dBm. Set the weight of the selling cost function w as 0.5, i.e., the trans-
mit loss of the wireless power transfer is 50 percent. w = 0.5, Di = 15,
P reqi /Si = 120uW/160uW . Take these parameter values into the Cournot
Model based Game and the Stackelberg Model based Game, and the algo-
rithm flow of game processes are represented in Algorithm 1 and Algorithm
2 respectively. The completely static energy cooperation method in which all
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Algorithm 2 Stackelberg Model based Game
1: Initialization: rb = 40k bits, bi = 10M Hz, N0 = −50 dBm, w = 0.5,
Di = 15, P
req
i /Si = 120uW/160uW ;
2: The value of selling volume of each first moving supplier, denoted asBx,
is known. The total value of the selling volume of the first m moving
suppliers is
∑m
x=1Bx and the number of second moving suppliers is set
as n;
3: Simplify payoff function of the second moving nodeNi: fs(pi) = (357−∑m
x=1Bx −
∑n
j=1,j 6=i pj − pi)pi − 4p2i ;
4: Deduce the expression of pi by solving the partial differential equation:
∂fs(p)
∂pi
= 0, thus far, pi = 110 (357−
∑m
x=1Bx −
∑n
j=1,j 6=i pj);
5: Solve the value of Bx of the first moving suppliers and accumulate the
value of the n second moving suppliers:
∑n
i=1 pi =
n(357−∑mx=1 Bx)
n+9 ;
6: The payoff function of the first moving node: fs(B) = (357 −∑n
i=1 pi −
∑m
y=1,y 6=xBy −Bx)Bx − 4B2x = (357− n(357−
∑m
x=1 Bx)
n+9 −∑m
y=1,y 6=xBy −Bx)Bx − 4B2x;
7: Achieve the value of Bx to maximize the payoff by solving the partial
differential equation: ∂fs(B)∂Bx = 0;
8: Take Bx back into step 4, the value of the selling volume of the first m
moving suppliers pi is solved.
the suppliers provide the same amount of energy is presented in Algorithm 3
as a comparison.
5.2 Numerical Simulation and Analysis
Optimal inventory amount of energy at each sensor node
Figure 2 shows the expected value of inventory cost with a higher holding
cost of the harvested energy. The optimal inventory quantity of energy makes
the expected value of inventory cost at a minimum level. For sensor nodes
with different traffic quantity during a time period, their optimal inventory
amount of energy and the minimum inventory cost are correspondingly dif-
ferent. As shown in the figure, when the traffic quantity is 5, 10 and 20 units,
the optimal inventory quantity of energy is 4, 9 and 19 units respectively, with
the minimum inventory cost 6.058, 8.552 and 12.15.
When the holding cost is lower, the optimal inventory amount of harvested
energy is shown in Figure 3. It is observed that the optimal inventory quan-
tity of energy is 7, 13 and 24 units respectively, with the minimum inventory
cost 3.277, 4.621 and 6.438, when the traffic quantity is 5, 10 and 20 units.
17
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
Holding cost is higher than shortage cost.
Energy Inventory Quantity S
Ex
pe
ct
ed
 V
al
ue
 o
f I
nv
en
to
ry
 C
os
t C
(S
)
Traffic Quantity 20→
Traffic Quantity 5→
Traffic Quantity 10→
 
 
5 10 15 20 25 30
0
50
100
X: 4
Y: 6.058
X: 9
Y: 8.552
X: 19
Y: 12.15
FIGURE 2
The optimal inventory quantity of energy at the sensor node with a higher holding
cost.
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The optimal inventory quantity of energy at the sensor node with a lower holding cost.
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Algorithm 3 Static Energy Cooperation Method
1: Initialization: rb = 40k bits, bi = 10M Hz, N0 = −50 dBm, w = 0.5,
Di = 15, P
req
i /Si = 120uW/160uW ;
2: for i = 1 : M do
3: Simplify the payoff function of energy supplier node Ni: fs(pi) =
(357 −∑Mi=1 pi)pi − 4p2i . Since each energy supplier node has the
same trade strategy, i.e., the selling volume is the same, the payoff
function is fs(pi) = (357−Mpi)pi − 4p2i ;
4: Deduce the expression of pi by solving the partial differential equation:
d(fs(p))
d(pi)
= 0;
5: Achieve the selling volume of each energy supplier: p = 357M2M+8 ;
6: end for
Compared with Figure 2, we can see that, with an equal quantity of traffic,
lower holding cost means that the optimal inventory amount of harvested en-
ergy is higher, and meanwhile the inventory cost is lower. It illustrates that,
for each sensor node, the cooperation based inventory amount of harvested
energy depends on the storage capacity and cost, and the traffic quantity.
Game theoretical approach to energy cooperation among sensor nodes
The process of achieving the Nash equilibrium solution of the Cournot Model
based Game is shown in Figure 4. Four energy suppliers are in this game,
and the history selling volume of energy of each supplier is set as 29.5uW ,
21.6uW , 24.7uW and 23.4uW . As shown in the figure, after 5 times game,
the equilibrium is achieved at the sixth time. The process of obtaining the
Nash Equilibrium solution of the Stackelberg Model based Game is shown
in Figure 5. Six energy suppliers are in the game with three first moving
suppliers and three second moving suppliers. The history decision is set as
29.5uW , 21.6uW , 24.7uW , 23.4uW , 20.4uW and 26.4uW respectively.
After 5 times game, the three first moving suppliers come to an equilibrium
value and the second moving suppliers come to the other equilibrium value.
The total selling volume through different cooperation method is shown
in Figure 6. The Stackelberg Model based Game 1 is the case: m = 1, n =
{1, 2, . . . , 19}, i.e., there are one supplier first moving to choose action and
the number of the second moving supplier increases from 1 to 19. The Stack-
elberg Model based Game 2 is the case: m = {1, 2, . . . , 19}, n = 1, i.e., the
number of the first moving supplier increases from 1 to 19, and there is one
supplier second moving to choose action. As we see from Figure 6, with the
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Game process of achieving the Nash equilibrium solution of the Cournot Model based
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Total selling volume of energy with different energy trading method.
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Energy price with different energy trading method.
same number of energy suppliers to sell their excess energy, the total selling
volume of energy through the Static Energy Cooperation Method is far less
than that though the game theoretic approach. It illustrates that, energy coop-
eration through the game theoretic approach can highly improve the utiliza-
tion ratio of the harvested energy distributed in the energy harvesting WSN.
In addition, the more sensor nodes in the game to supply energy the more
surplus harvested energy will be sold to the energy insufficient node. The to-
tal selling volume of the Stackelberg Model based Game and Cournot Model
based Game is similar, however the performance is still different. Zooming
up Figure 6 and freely choosing a part, take 5, 6 suppliers and 9, 10 suppliers
as examples shown in Figure 7. The Stackelberg Model based Game sells
more energy than the Cournot Model based Game. It means that in the aspect
of increasing the utilization ratio of the harvested energy, the dynamic game
we propose is better than the static game. More specialized, the Stackelberg
Model based Game 2 sells more energy than the Stackelberg Model based
Game 1. This reflects the first moving advantage of the Stackelberg Model
based Game.
The price of the selling energy is shown in Figure 8. With the increase
of the number of energy suppliers, the price of selling energy through the
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game theoretic approach is much lower than that through Static Energy Co-
operation Method. It is expected, since the more energy is in the market to
be sold the price of the energy will be lower. We have verify in Figure 6 that
energy supplier node will provide more energy to the demander node through
the game theoretic approach. The price of energy sold through the Stackel-
berg Model based Game is lower than that through the Cournot Model based
Game. The first moving advantage of the Stackelberg Model based Game is
also reflected in the price. The lowest price of energy appears in the Stackel-
berg Model based Game 2.
6 CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we proposed a game theoretic framework for energy coopera-
tion in wireless sensor networks with energy harvesting and wireless power
transfer. Based on the optimal inventory amount of energy at each sensor
node, sensor nodes with excess energy sold part of their energy to nodes with
energy shortage through the Stackelberg Model based Game and Cournot
Model based Game we designed to balance the energy at each sensor node
and increase the total energy utilization ratio. The numerical results showed
that compared with the static energy cooperation method, energy cooperation
through the game theoretic approach can highly improve the utilization ra-
tio of the harvested energy distributed in the energy harvesting WSNs by a
higher selling volume of energy with a lower price. The Stackelberg Model
based Game sold more energy than the Cournot Model based Game, i.e., the
dynamic game was better than the static game. More specialized, the Stack-
elberg Model based Game 2 sold more energy than the Stackelberg Model
based Game 1. This reflected the first moving advantage of the Stackelberg
Model based Game.
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